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The National Football League (NFL) is a joint venture, 
comprised of thirty-two independently owned and operated 
football teams.  Other than on-field competition, there is also 
extensive off-field competition between the teams.  Each team 
owns its independent trademarks, creating the potential for 
economic competition over the sale of team merchandise. 
Since 1963, however, under an agreement with National 
Football League Properties (NFLP),1 each NFL team has 
given up the rights to trademark its team merchandise and to 
compete over the sale of merchandise.  Under the collective 
agreement, NFLP has been solely responsible for licensing 
and marketing the trademarks and logos of each team. 
The NFLP arrangement is neither new nor unique to the 
professional football industry. Virtually all teams in American 
professional sports leagues, such as Major League Baseball, 
the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey 
League, also designate their trademark and marketing rights 
to a central licensor.2 
In 2002, however, NFLP broke from the industry norm.  
While other central licensors tolerate the existence of multiple 
licensees, NFLP signed an exclusive $250 million, ten-year 
agreement with Reebok,3 granting this sports apparel giant 
the exclusive right to license the NFL logo for use on sports 
paraphernalia.4 
NFLP renewed its agreement in 2012, granting Nike and 
 
 1.  National Football League Properties, whose predecessor is the National 
Football Trust, is the central merchandising and licensing arm of the NFL. 
 2.  Other central licensing entities include Major League Baseball Properties, 
National Basketball League Properties, and National Hockey League Properties. 
 3.  Ken Belson, Nike to Replace Reebok as N.F.L.’s Licensed-Apparel Maker, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/ 
sports/football/13nike.html?_r=0. 
 4.  Dennis Dillon, NFL Getting Ready to Transition to New Nike Era for Apparel, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (April 2, 2012), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/ 
writers/dennis_dillon/04/02/nike/index.html. 
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New Era an exclusive five-year contract to manufacture NFL 
uniforms and headwear.  Subsequently, the NFL went on to 
ruthlessly police its contracts, adopting policies requiring 
every professional athlete to display the “Nike” symbol 
prominently before and after every game.5  For example, in 
August of 2013, the NFL fined Robert Griffin III, quarterback 
for the Washington Redskins, $10,000 for wearing a non-
logoed tee-shirt during football practice.6 
The greatest challenge to NFLP’s practice came in 2007, 
when American Needle Inc.  (ANI), one of the apparel 
manufactures precluded from the football licensing business, 
alleged that NFLP’s agreement with Reebok violated §1 of the 
Sherman Act.7  In the ensuing litigation, both the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, as well as 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals summarily dismissed 
ANI’s challenge.  With respect to their licensing practices, the 
courts held that the NFL and its thirty-two teams are, “in the 
jargon of antitrust law, acting as a single entity.”8  Therefore, 
there cannot be a “joining of . . . independent sources of 
economic power previously pursuing separate interests.”9 
Granting certiorari in 2010,10 the United States Supreme 
Court reversed and held that the NFL’s licensing activities 
constitute concerted action subject to Sherman Act scrutiny.11  
The Court then remanded American Needle to the lower 
courts, which must now determine whether NFLP’s 
agreement to market collectively, combined with the 
agreement to designate an exclusive licensee, violates §1 of 
the Sherman Act.12 
Focusing on this point of contention, this Article will 
 
 5.  Chris Yuscavage, Robert Griffin III Refused to Wear Nike Before a Game For 
the Second Straight Week Yesterday, COMPLEX SPORTS (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://www.complex.com/sports/2012/09/robert-griffin-iii-refused-to-wear-nike-before-a-
game-for-the-second-straight-week-yesterday.  
 6.  Kareem Copeland, Robert Griffin III Fined $10K by NFL for Postgame Gear, 
NFL (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000113955/article/robert-
griffin-iii-fined-10k-by-nfl-for-postgame-gear. 
 7.  The Sherman Act states that, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. . .is declared to be 
illegal.” Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §1 (2004). 
 8.  Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 184 (2010). 
 9.  Id. at 196.  
 10.  Id. at 189. 
 11.  Id. at 202.  
 12.  Id.; see infra Part III for a detailed Rule of Reason analysis. 
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critically evaluate NFLP’s provisions under the Sherman Act.  
The analysis will be divided into three main parts.  Part I 
analyzes the threshold inquiry of whether there exists market 
power in the market for licensing intellectual property of the 
NFL.  Part II advocates a quick-look inquiry for ruling 
NFLP’s provisions anticompetitive.  Part III applies the rule 
of reason to the NFLP restrictions, noting that the 
anticompetitive harms substantially outweigh any 
procompetitive benefits and suggesting less-restrictive 
alternatives.  Finally, this Article concludes that the current 
NFLP provisions pose serious harms and should be rendered 
illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
I. MARKET POWER 
It is imperative that ANI determine the existence of 
market power in order to characterize the NFL’s agreement 
as a direct violation of the Sherman Act.  market power 
ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of a 
predominant share of the market,13 and has been defined as 
“the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict 
output.”14 Market power is a threshold filter, because it 
prevents plaintiffs from pursuing a case where the defendant 
is unable to cause anticompetitive effects in the relevant 
market.15 Only restraints that present a real possibility of 
anticompetitive behavior will be subject to rule-of-reason 
scrutiny.16 
Applying the concept of market power, and in 
demonstrating the potential for anticompetitive effects, ANI 
must show that NFL teams exercise market power over some 
aspect of trademark licensing.17  In support of its claim, ANI 
can demonstrate either direct evidence of market power 
through increased prices or secondary evidence of market 
power through expert findings of a narrow relevant market 
 
 13.  Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992). 
 14.  U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).  
 15.  Tim Hance, Note, Threading American Needle: Defining a Narrow Relevant 
Market for Rule of Reason Analysis in Sports Antitrust Cases, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 247, 250 (2011). 
 16.  Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for 
Sports Leagues, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 840-41 (2009).  
 17.  Market power is defined as “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 592. 
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for NFL licensed apparel.18 
A. Direct Evidence of Market Power 
In furthering its antitrust suit against the NFL, ANI can 
use direct evidence to show market power.  Specifically,  ANI 
can argue that, since the advent of the exclusivity agreement 
with Reebok in the early 2000s, NFL sports gear has 
increased in price.19  In fact, a 2006 article demonstrates that 
the price of NFL headwear increased in the early 2000s.20  
The price of NFL clubs’ replica jerseys also increased in price 
from 2002 to 2003.21 
However, there are drawbacks in using direct evidence of 
price increases to demonstrate market power.  Relying on 
such evidence may conflate collective conduct with 
exclusionary conduct.22  While collective conduct is not illegal, 
as most sports leagues designate central entities to exploit 
collective intellectual property rights, exclusive conduct, in 
which the central entity further designates a sole licensee, is 
illegal.23  Here, ANI’s argument relies on data combining 
NFL’s exclusionary conduct, which began in 2000 with its 
concerted conduct, which began in 1963.24  Hence, the price 
increase from the early 2000s might not be a direct result of 
NFLP’s exclusionary conduct.25  Therefore, the price increase 
may not necessarily illustrate a joining of economic interests 
in a manner that illegally restrains trade under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.26 
 
 18.  Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing 
Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l 
Football League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 204 (2011). 
 19.  Id. at 205. 
 20.  NFL gear increased in price from $19.99 to $30.00. Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Edelman, supra note 18, at 204; Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An 
Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009).  
 23.  See Matthew J. Mitten, From Dallas Cap to American Needle and Beyond: 
Antitrust Law’s Limited Capacity to Stitch Consumer Harm from Professional Sports 
Club Trademark Monopolies, 86 TUL. L. REV. 901, 927 (2012); see also infra Part II, 
Section B, Subpart 1.  
 24.  Edelman, supra note 18, at 204. 
 25.  Id.; see infra Part II for a discussion of the distinction between NFLP’s 
exclusionary conduct and its concerted conduct.  
 26.  Edelman, supra note 18, at 205. 
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B. Secondary Evidence of Market Power 
ANI can also use secondary evidence to illustrate market 
power by defining a narrow product market.  Reason being, 
evidence of competitive effects can be informative regarding 
market definition, “just as market definition can be 
informative regarding competitive effects.”27  Competitive 
effects will be magnified in a narrower market as opposed to a 
broader one.  Thus, in order to determine the extent of the 
harms stemming from NFLP’s restrictions, ANI must 
determine the size of the market affected.28 
Here, NFLP has restricted the entire market for the 
licensing of intellectual property to be used for professional 
football paraphernalia.  Accordingly, NFLP’s restrictions will 
be deemed anticompetitive if there is a narrow product 
market suited for professional football merchandise alone.29  
If, on the other hand, the market is so broad that NFLP 
cannot alter the “interaction of supply and demand,”30 then its 
restrictions will not be deemed anticompetitive. 
Applying the concept of secondary market power to 
successfully argue for a narrow product market, ANI must 
show that NFL-licensed paraphernalia constitutes a unique 
market and that there are no substitutes available.31  ANI 
will succeed if there is a class of consumers who choose to 
purchase only NFL merchandise at the expense of all other 
entertainment products.  As a result of NFLP’s restrictions on 
the market for NFL merchandise, significant competitive 
harm has been imposed.32 
By contrast, to argue for a broad product market, NFLP 
must show that there is no unique consumer market for NFL 
merchandise.33  NFLP must show that the relevant market is 
that of the broader sports or entertainment product market.34  
When viewed in this context, the NFLP’s restrictions would 
pose little to no competitive harm. 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, § 2, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (2010). 
 29.  Hance, supra note 15, at 253. 
 30.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).  
 31.  Edelman, supra note 18, at 206. 
 32.  Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 330 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 33.  NCAA, 468 U.S. at 94. 
 34.  Edelman, supra note 18, at 206. 
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Determining whether NFL teams compete with one 
another or with the broader entertainment market will be 
dispositive of the issue of market power.35  If a narrow product 
definition can be established, ANI will have established the 
requisite market power to succeed in its suit against the NFL.  
The following sections will advocate for a narrow product 
definition based on an assessment of the relevant parameters 
such as practical observations as well as legal precedents 
evidencing a narrow product market. 
1. Practical Observations 
ANI could successfully argue for a narrow product 
definition based on the practical observation that sports 
teams compete directly with other franchises in their same 
league and region. Such observations indicate the existence of 
many “die-hard” football fans who root for specific NFL 
franchises.  Such fans purchase intra-league products of the 
NFL rather than products of other sports leagues.36  In turn, 
this selective consumer market for NFL merchandise implies 
the existence of a narrow product market. 
On a regional basis, for example, within the geographic 
submarket of New York/Northern New Jersey, a football fan’s 
closest substitute to a New York Giants cap would be a New 
York Jets cap, rather than a cap from another sports league, 
such as a New York Yankees cap.37 
Furthermore, in regions with multiple NFL teams, such as 
the San Francisco Bay Area, where the San Francisco 49ers 
and Oakland Raiders play in close proximity, both teams are 
accessible to most fans.38  Football fans would likely view 
49ers and Raiders products as perfect substitutes, choosing 
one team over the other. Therefore, the 49ers and the Raiders 
would most likely compete for retail space in the San 
Francisco area.39 
Finally, in regions where no local NFL teams exist, the 
range for competing NFL merchandise is even broader. On a 
national scale, NFL teams compete in a single product market 
 
 35.  Hance, supra note 15, at 256. 
 36.  Edelman, supra note 18, at 207. 
 37.  Id. at 208.   
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Also, the Jacksonville Jaguars and Tampa Bay Buccaneers are two franchises 
within a 140-mile radius of one another. Id. 
HE_AMERICAN NEEDLE UPON REMAND.DOCX 4/23/2014  10:41 AM 
50 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 24 
limited to the teams’ individual logos.40  This competition is 
based upon the teams’ on-the-field performance, logo, and 
color scheme.41  The Dallas Cowboys, with their winning 
tradition, frequently compete nationally with other 
championship teams such as the Bears, Packers, Steelers, and 
Raiders for fans and merchandise sales.42 
2. Precedent Challenges 
While courts have not evaluated whether NFL sports 
merchandise constitutes a narrow product market, challenges 
have been brought and could serve as a useful basis for ANI’s 
antitrust lawsuit.43  Indeed, plaintiffs have succeeded in 
arguing for unique, niche product markets catering to fans of 
specific sports.44  Ultimately, ANI should look towards 
complaints that were filed by Jerry Jones of the Dallas 
Cowboys and George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees 
as guidance in pursuing an antitrust lawsuit against the 
NFL. 
In 1996, in Dallas Cowboys v. National Football League 
Trust,45 Dallas Cowboys Owner Jerry Jones brought an 
antitrust suit against NFLP.46  Jones argued for a narrow 
product market – that the trademarking rights for NFL 
merchandise “have no close substitutes and are not 
reasonably interchangeable in use with any other products or 
rights . . . .”47 In the absence of NFLP, NFL member clubs 
 
 40.  Id. at 209.  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Denise Gellene, It’s Getting Easier Being Green  . . . for Merchandisers, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1997 (noting how Green Bay Packers merchandise sales increased 
dramatically as a result of the team’s Superbowl appearance, strong history, and rich 
tradition); c.f. Jeff Duncan, Delhomme Gambling on Starting Job: QB Left Saints, Home 
on a Mission to Find More Playing Time with Panthers, NEW ORLEANS TIMES 
PICAYUNE, Jul. 20, 2003, at 3 (noting how Cowboys merchandise previously comprised 
of 30% of the NFL apparel market). 
 43.  See e.g. Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory 
Relief, Dallas Cowboys v. Nat’l Football League Trust, No. 95 Civ. 9426 (2d Cir. 1996), 
1996 WL 34473933.  
 44.  See e.g. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. U.S., 358 U.S. 242 (1959); NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 45.  Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at ¶ 33. 
 46.  Jones’ antitrust Complaint alleged that NFLP prevented the individual NFL 
teams from independently exploiting their own trademarks. However, the Dallas 
Cowboys case settled before trial and before the issue of market power was could be 
directly addressed by the court. Id. 
 47.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
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would compete with one another in the professional football 
merchandise market.48 
Similarly, in 1997, George Steinbrenner sued MLBP to 
gain more control over the Yankees’ intellectual property.49  
Like Jones, Steinbrenner alleged the existence of a narrow 
market reserved exclusively for the licensing of professional 
baseball products.50  MLBP’s restraint prevented each Club 
from competing with one another in the market for baseball 
licensing.51  Without MLBP, the Yankees could market its 
own popular and distinctive “NY” brand and negotiate 
independent contracts with licensees.52 
However, both Jones’s and Steinbrenner’s cases settled 
before the issue of market power was reached.53  Thus, the 
Court did not make a determination as to whether Jones’s or 
Steinbrenner’s market characterizations were accurate.  By 
contrast, the Supreme Court did reach the market power 
issue in International Boxing Club of New York v. U.S.54  
Here, the Supreme Court drew a definitive distinction 
between championship-boxing matches and regular boxing 
matches.55  By comparing and contrasting revenues generated 
and consumer and supplier demand for championship versus 
regular boxing matches, the Court found that championship-
boxing is uniquely attractive to fans and constitutes a 
“separate, identifiable market.”56 International Boxing Club 
therefore shows that courts will draw distinctions in market 
power, and thereby find separate identifiable markets, where 
there are different levels of demand for products in that 
market. 
Likewise, in NCAA v. Board of Regents,57 the Supreme 
Court drew another distinction as to the factual 
 
 48.  Hance, supra note 15, at 273. 
 49.  See Complaint Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, N.Y. Yankees v. 
Major League Baseball Enter., No. 97-1153-civ-T-25B (M.D. Fla. 1997), available at 
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/FAQ/plaintiff/COMPLAINT.htm. 
 50.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id. ¶¶ 29, 63. 
 53.  See Hance, supra note 15, at 273. 
 54.  Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. U.S., 358 U.S. 242 (1959).  
 55.  The Court disagreed with the argument that “any boxing contest, whether 
championship or not, always includes one ring, two boxers and one referee, fighting 
under the same rules . . . . “ Id. at 251. 
 56.  Id. at 250. 
 57.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
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circumstances illustrating the existence of market power.  
The Supreme Court found that the broadcast market for 
college football is unique and differs from the market for other 
entertainment products.  The Court held that there are no 
other products that are reasonably interchangeable with 
college football.58  The NCAA’s complete control over college 
football broadcasts supports the conclusion that the NCAA 
possesses market power with respect to those broadcasts.59  
The fact that advertisers would be willing to pay a premium 
price per viewer for fans of college football “is vivid evidence of 
the uniqueness of this product.”60 
In dicta, the Supreme Court compared the attributes of 
college football to professional football, concluding that 
professional football in the NFL also caters to a unique 
demographic.61 While many attributes of college football are 
most similar to, and substitutable with those of professional 
football, the NFL does not broadcast on Saturdays in 
competition with college football.62  Instead, NFL viewers 
typically watch on Sundays (whereas college football viewers 
watch on Saturdays) and advertisers have paid premium 
prices to capture audiences of both college and professional 
football.63  As noted, these distinctions would support ANI’s 
argument for a distinct product market for professional 
football. 
3. Market Power Definition in the Context of Professional 
Baseball 
Similar to the professional football context, there has been 
extensive analysis over the market power for professional 
baseball products. However, courts have failed to reach a 
definitive opinion on the proper product market definition for 
the sport of professional baseball.  Ironically, rather than hurt 
ANI’s arguments, the cases deficiencies and their attendant 
criticisms support ANI’s argument for a unique market for 
professional football products. 
 
 58.  Id. at 111. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 111 n. 47. 
 62.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1293 (1961).  
 63.  Hance, supra note 15, at 265. 
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Major League Baseball Properties v. Salvino,64 a Second 
Circuit decision, is a rare instance where a court has reached 
a decision on the market for sports licensing.  However, the 
court’s decision is problematic in light of an evidentiary 
imbalance.  Whereas the defendant, MLBP, chiefly relied on 
market definition to advance its litigation strategy, 
orchestrating numerous empirical studies to support a broad 
market definition,65 the plaintiff, Salvino, failed to present 
sufficient evidence contesting the relevant market.  Here, 
Salvino unsuccessfully argued for the application of a quick-
look analysis, asserting that MLBP’s anticompetitive effects 
clearly overshadowed the need for a detailed assessment 
illustrating market power.66 The following section will discuss 
the Salvino case and the strengths and weaknesses in 
asserting an anti-trust claim under a quick look analysis. 
a. Quick Look Analysis v. Rule of Reason for 
Establishing a Narrow Market 
In Salvino, MLBP did not grant Salvino permission to use 
its trademarks, preventing it from manufacturing and selling 
a line of MLB branded “Bammers” plush toys.67 In response, 
Salvino challenged the legality of the baseball clubs’ 
agreement to collectively designate MLBP as the exclusive 
licensing agent of the MLB clubs.68 Salvino claimed that the 
collective agreement to designate a central licensor was so 
anticompetitive that it should be deemed per se illegal under 
the Sherman Act69 or illegal under a quick look analysis.70 
Under a quick look analysis, the plaintiff’s prima facie 
burden of proving market power is replaced with a 
presumption of competitive harm from the very nature of the 
challenged conduct.71 Thus, the quick look analysis relieves 
 
 64.  Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 65.  Id. at 301.  
 66.  Id. at 307.  
 67.  MLBP sent Salvino a “cease and desist letter” after learning that Salvino sold 
Bammers to the Arizona Diamondbacks baseball club with the Diamondbacks logo on 
them. Id. at 295. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  The District Court rejected the per se approach; noting the existence of pro-
competitive benefits as mentioned in BMI. Procompetitive efficiencies include 
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement. See  id. at 306-07.  
 70.  See infra Section III. 
 71. The Truncated or Quick Look Rule of Reason, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
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the plaintiff from having to prove the relevant market and the 
defendant’s market power.72  By contrast, under the rule of 
reason, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the 
challenged conduct has “an actual adverse effect on 
competition as a whole in the relevant market.”73  Therefore, 
characterizing the relevant market is “an indispensable 
ingredient,”74 to finding a violation under the Sherman Act.75 
Evaluating Salvino, the United States District Court of 
the Southern District of New York dismissed Salvino’s 
arguments, because the anticompetitive effects of MLBP’s 
agreement were not obvious.76  Rather than a per se or quick 
look analysis, the court held that MLBP’s restrictions should 
instead be subject to a rule of reason inquiry.77  Under a rule 
of reason inquiry, the plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant possesses, “the requisite market power” and thus 
the capacity to inhibit competition market-wide.78 
With respect to market power, MLBP asserted what 
Salvino criticized as the “self-serving view,”79 that the 
relevant market is the broader entertainment market.  With 
the help of its chief economic advisor, Franklin M. Fisher, 
MLBP conducted extensive market research studies that 
supported a broad definition of the relevant product market.80  
Relying on MLBP’s studies, the district court ruled in favor of 
MLBP and held that “Salvino ha[d] failed to offer any 
evidence of MLBP’s actual adverse effect on the market or its 
sufficient market power.”81 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Salvino again pressed its 
 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20100604091202/http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ 
jointvent/3Persepap.shtm (accessed by searching for Federal Trade Commission in the 
Internet Archive index).  
 72.  Id. 
 73. Major League Baseball, Inc. v. Salvino Inc., 420 F.Supp.2d 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005)(quoting Capital Imaging Assocs. P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc. 996 
F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 74.  Chicago Prof’l Sports v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
 75.  Hance, supra note 15, at 283. 
 76.  “[A] casual observer could not summarily conclude that MLBP’s arrangement 
has an anticompetitive effect on customers.” Salvino, F.Supp.2d at 220. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 221 (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 
123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 79.  Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. 542 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 80.  Hance supra note 15, at 276. 
 81.  Salvino, 420 F.Supp.2d at 221.   
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argument that the court should find the collectivity 
agreements illegal per se or illegal under a “quick-look” 
analysis.82 Salvino argued that, under the quick look analysis, 
the rule of reason can be applied in the “twinkling of an eye,”83 
because the anticompetitive harms of MLBP’s restraints are 
so “intuitively obvious,”84 that a demonstration of market 
power is unnecessary.85  Thus, Salvino “dismisse[d] as 
immaterial MLBP’s attempts to define the relevant 
market . . . .”86  Salvino argued that the existence of a naked 
restraint on output and price should excuse it from having to 
prove market power and shifts the burden to MLBP to prove 
that the restraint has some competitive justification.87 
Because Salvino contended the proper test was a per se or 
quick-look analysis,88 it did not go to the length and expense 
of preparing a detailed analysis of the relevant market as is 
needed under the rule of reason test.89  Nevertheless, during 
the discovery phase of trial, Salvino’s chief economic expert, 
Louis A. Guth, prepared a report claiming that there are no 
close substitutes to the intellectual property rights of MLBP.90 
Guth asserted that a “discrete choice” survey would 
demonstrate that consumers’ product preferences would not 
change with either increases in price of MLBP licensed 
products or decreases in price of other branded products.91 
By contrast, Fisher provided evidence (Fisher Report) that 
prospective licensees of MLBP “displayed interest in using 
intellectual property of inter alia, other sports entities and 
leagues.”92 Among these examples, Fisher cited: Coca-Cola 
choosing NFL intellectual property over MLB intellectual 
property for its nationwide promotional campaign; Salvino 
itself selling Bammers bearing the intellectual property of a 
 
 82.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 294.  
 83.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984).  
 84.  Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999). 
 85.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 86.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 308. 
 87.  See Memorandum in Opposition to MLBP Motion for Summary Judgment at 8 
n. 3, Salvino 542 F.3d 290 (No. 06-1867-cv); Salvino Response to MLBP 56.1 Statement 
at ¶¶ 60-61, Salvino, 542 F.3d 290 (No. 06-1867-cv). 
 88.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 309; see infra Part II for a discussion of the quick-look 
analysis, holding that demonstrating market power is unnecessary in this context. 
 89.  Hance, supra note 15, at 275. 
 90.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 301 (quoting Expert Report of Louis A. Guth). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 330 (quoting Expert Report of Franklin M. Fisher). 
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wide variety of sports leagues and figures, such as the NFL, 
the NBA, and the NHL; and a MLBP-conducted market 
research study, which found that major competitors for 
intellectual property licensing included apparel manufactures 
like Nike, other sports entities like the NBA, and 
entertainment companies such as Warner Brothers and 
Disney.93 
Notwithstanding the imbalance in the parties’ cases, in the 
subsequent Second Circuit decision, the majority stressed the 
weakness in Salvino’s expert report.  The court criticized the 
Guth Report as “entirely conclusory . . . neither accompanied 
by any evidentiary citation nor followed by any 
elaboration . . . [in contrast to the] Fisher Report.”94  Given 
the quality of the Fisher Report, the court sided with MLBP 
and concluded that the MLB teams competed with the 
broader entertainment market in licensing its intellectual 
property.95 
Evidently, MLBP went to great lengths to prepare the 
Fisher Report, because its primary contention was that there 
should be a rule of reason inquiry.  By contrast, Salvino did 
not fully contest the issue of the relevant market, because its 
primary contention was that a per se analysis should apply.  
In response to MLBP’s deposition on the relevant product 
market, Guth even admitted, “I really don’t [have an 
opinion] . . . I’m going to leave that to an empirical analysis.”96 
In Attorney Tim Hance’s article advocating a narrow 
product market for ANI, he has similarly argued that the 
Salvino court’s analysis suffers from deficiencies.97  Hance has 
noted that Salvino “did not show how the MLBP’s activities 
were anticompetitive as a whole when analyzed under the 
rule of reason test.”98 Therefore, “the court had no choice but 
to accept the MLBP’s evidence of market power because it 
was the only evidence submitted.”99 
 
 93.  Hance, supra note 15, at 276. However, Hance notes that Fisher focused his 
survey on the licensees of MLB merchandise, rather than on the fans and consumers of 
products containing the MLB logo. Compared to fans, these licensees have a greater 
variety of options for substituting MLB-logoed apparel. Id. 
 94.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 311. 
 95.  Id. at 333-34. 
 96.  Hance, supra note 15, at 276-77 (quoting Guth’s deposition). 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  Id.at 275-76. 
 99.  Id.at 277.   
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Indeed, “general characterizations of the NFL’s relevant 
market will not suffice, just as Salvino’s general 
characterizations of the MLB’s relevant market did not hold 
up in Salvino.”100 Given the increasing importance of 
intellectual property sales in sports, relevant market and 
empirical studies are needed for a rule of reason analysis.101 
Rather than a superficial analysis, conducting detailed 
econometric studies will greatly benefit future cases analyzed 
under the rule of reason.102 
In summary, there is no direct precedent that supports a 
narrow definition of the product market for NFL branded 
merchandise.  However, support may be gathered by 
observing a consumer audience unique to professional 
football, analyzing the holding of International Boxing and 
NCAA, and supplementing missing empirical data. 
II. QUICK-LOOK ANALYSIS IN DETAIL 
As evidenced, there is still ambiguity as to whether 
market power exists in the market for football licensing.103 
Notwithstanding this defect, ANI can push the courts to 
conduct the abbreviated “quick look” analysis using either of 
two tests.  First, courts will apply the quick look analysis 
when the anticompetitive effects are so intuitively obvious 
that the plaintiff need only present a simplified market 
analysis.104  Anticompetitive effects are so intuitively obvious 
when there exists such a restraint that, “no elaborate 
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive character of . . . [the defendant’s] 
agreement.”105  Second, courts will apply a quick-look analysis 
when a particular restraint “is not reasonably necessary to 
achieve any of the efficiency-enhancing benefits” claimed and 
merely serves as a “naked restraint against competition.”106  
The Supreme Court case, National Collegiate Athletic 
Association v. Board of Regents, is a clear demonstration of 
how both quick look tests can be applied. 
 
 100.  Id. at 284. 
 101.  Id. at 284-85. 
 102.  Hance, supra note 15, at 284. 
 103.  See supra Part I.  
 104.  See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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A. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 
Applying the Quick Look Analysis Test 
In asserting the quick-look analysis against NFLP, ANI 
can look to the landmark case of NCAA v. Board of Regents.107 
This case centered on the NCAA’s plan for televising college 
football games.108 Under the plan, the NCAA made 
agreements with the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) 
and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) for rights to 
telecast live college football games.109  The plan forbade 
member institutions of the NCAA from making any sale of 
television rights except in accordance with the NCAA’s 
agreements with ABC and CBS.110 Under the plan, no 
member institution could appear on television more than six 
times. Additionally member schools would be prohibited from 
appearing in more than four national broadcasts.111 Moreover, 
prices were subject to a NCAA recommended fee, even though 
networks could negotiate with member schools for the right to 
televise games.112 
In the ensuing litigation, member institutions brought suit 
against the NCAA under the Sherman Act, asserting that the 
NCAA’s broadcast restrictions violated antitrust laws.113 The 
plaintiffs contended that the NCAA had “unreasonably 
restrained trade in the televising of college football games.”114 
Both the District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma 
as well as the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found 
that the NCAA’s plan violated §1 of the Sherman Act and 
constituted “illegal per se price fixing.”115 
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the NCAA plan 
prevented member institutions from competing against one 
another on the basis of price or otherwise.116 The Court found 
that the restrictions were a horizontal restraint among 
competitors that placed an artificial ceiling on available 
 
 107.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  
 108.  Id. at 91-92.  
 109.  Id. at 92.  
 110.  See id. at 92-93.  
 111.  Id. at 94. 
 112.  Id. at 93. 
 113.  NCAA, 468 U.S. at 95.  
 114.  Id. at 88. 
 115.  Id. at 97 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 
1983). 
 116.  Id.at 106-07.  
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output.117 The restrictions also increased the price that 
networks paid to broadcast games.  Finally, the restrictions 
were inconsistent with the “fundamental goal of antitrust 
law,”118 as ultimate consumer demand had little bearing when 
setting price and output of the broadcasts.119 
Despite noting that horizontal restraints similar to the one 
used by the NCAA are “presumed unreasonable,”120 the Court 
stated that it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule in 
the context of league sports, where restraints are necessary 
for the product to be available at all.121  Instead, there is a 
need to determine whether the NCAA’s restraint is merely 
ancillary to a legitimate purpose, or a naked restraint on 
competition.122 Here, the apparent anticompetitive behavior of 
the NCAA created a heavy burden for the NCAA to prove that 
its restriction was not a classic restraint on price and 
output.123 
The NCAA justified its position by establishing a need to 
prevent “the adverse effects of live television upon football 
game attendance.”124 However, the Supreme Court rejected 
the NCAA’s argument as “inconsistent with the basic policy of 
the Sherman Act.”125 In essence, NCAA argued that live 
college games should be insulated from the full spectrum of 
competition because the product is not sufficiently attractive 
to consumers.126 This argument is inconsistent with basic 
economic policies underpinning a free market;127 advancing 
the proposition that “competition itself is unreasonable.”128 
Rejecting each of the NCAA’s other pre-textual 
justifications,129 the Supreme Court went on to hold that the 
NCAA’s exclusive sale of football television rights is a non-
 
 117.  Id.at 117.  
 118.  Id. at 107. 
 119.  NCAA. 468 U.S. at 107. 
 120.  Id. at 100. 
 121.  Id. at 101. 
 122.  See id. at 109-110 (stating that “naked restraint[s] on price and output 
requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market 
analysis.”). 
 123.  Id. at 113.; Hance, supra note 15, at 265. 
 124.  NCAA, 468 U.S. at 91 n.6. 
 125.  Id. at 117.  
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). 
 129.  See id. at 114-20. 
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ancillary, naked restraint that reduced output and increased 
prices, to the detriment of consumers.130 
B. Under the Quick-Look Analysis in NCAA, NFLP Violates 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act 
Similar to the Court’s holding in NCAA, the NFL teams’ 
collective grant of exclusive rights to a single licensee, defined 
as, “exclusive product category licenses,”131 should be struck 
down under a quick-look inquiry.  In conducting the analysis, 
this section will first discuss “collective exclusive trademark 
licensing” and how such licensing agreements have survived 
quick look analysis scrutiny. Specifically this section will 
discuss the Salvino case and its analysis of MPBP’s use of 
collective exclusive trademark licensing agreements. Next, 
this section will discuss “collective exclusive product category 
licensing.” Specifically, this section will discuss the NFLP’s 
use of collective exclusive product category licensing and how 
such agreements pose significant risk of anticompetitive 
harms.  Ultimately, this section concludes that the NFLP’s 
use of collective exclusive product category licensing violates § 
1 of the Sherman Act under a quick look analysis. 
1. Collective Exclusive Trademark Licensing 
MLBP follows the practice of collective exclusive 
trademark licensing.  Similar to NFL teams, individual MLB 
clubs agree to pool their intellectual property rights, with 
each club relinquishing the right to market its own 
intellectual property.132 As the clubs’ exclusive licensing 
agent, MLBP then licenses the intellectual property for all of 
the MLB teams to multiple competing licensees.133 Under its 
arrangement, MLBP also charges a “standard royalty 
percentage” license for products bearing a MLB club’s 
trademark, regardless of variations in a club’s popularity 
among consumers, and regardless of the amount of revenues 
generated by the licensing of a club’s individual intellectual 
property.134  Each club then receives an equal, pro rata share 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Mitten, supra note 23, at 904. 
 132.  Id. at 902. 
 133.  Id. at 921. 
 134.  Id. at 920. 
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of profits from licensing royalties.135 
In Salvino, the plaintiff challenged MLBP’s collective 
licensing arrangement and argued that it should be deemed 
illegal under a quick look analysis.  The plaintiff argued that 
the arrangement is a naked restraint on both price and 
output,136 and that the exclusivity and profit sharing 
provisions of the MLBP agreement serve no purpose but to 
stifle competition.137 
As discussed supra,138 a majority of the Second Circuit 
found no evidence of “an actual adverse effect on competition 
as a whole in the relevant market . . .”139 (thereby rejecting 
Salvino’s contention that the MLBP’s provisions should be 
struck down under a quick look analysis).140 The court began 
by “examining the nature of Salvino’s contentions as to 
‘output’ and ‘price,’”141 and determined that MLBP’s 
arrangements “might plausibly be thought to have a net 
procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on 
competition.”142  Therefore, more than a “quick look” is 
required.143 
With respect to output, the court found no evidence to 
support Salvino’s contentions.  The clubs’ decision to make 
MLBP their exclusive licensor did not “necessarily reduce the 
number of licenses issued,” rather, “it merely alter[ed] the 
identity of the licenses’ issuer.”144 In fact, the record showed 
an increase, rather than a decrease, in the licensing of the 
clubs’ trademarks.145 
 
 135.  Id.at 921.  
 136.  See supra Part I, Section B, Subpart 1. 
 137.  Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(As Salvino explains, “Without the exclusivity requirement, potential licensees would 
have the freedom to either seek out each team for individualized arrangements or deal 
with all teams through the centralized agency of MLBP.”). 
 138.  See supra Part I, Section B, Subpart 3.  
 139.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 341 (quoting Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs 
Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 506-07 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 140.  See generally Salvino, 542 F.3d at 319.  
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999)). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 318. 
 145.  According to the court, the record showed that:  
When MLBP became the Clubs’ exclusive licensor in 1987, there were 
approximately 100 licensees. . .thereafter, the number of licensees more than 
doubled. And in the years since, the number has continued to grow, with 
MLBP having, at the time of its summary judgment motion in this case, more 
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With respect to price, the majority rejected Salvino’s 
contention that the standard licensing fee agreement for the 
Clubs’ trademarks and the pro rata sharing of profits 
constitutes illegal price fixing.146 MLB’s revenue sharing 
agreement is not, in fact, an agreement on price.147 Indeed, 
there has been no horizontal agreement to fix the prices of be 
charged to licensees.148 Rather, profit sharing only fixes the 
compensation scheme for individual clubs.149 As 
interdependent entities, the professional baseball 
entertainment product is actually enhanced and protected by 
fostering a competitive balance among the clubs.150 Profit 
sharing is thus a legitimate means of maintaining a measure 
of competitive balance.151 
In concurrence, then-Judge Sotomayor agreed that Salvino 
fails to fit within the purview of the per se analysis; arriving 
at her conclusion “using a different framework” from the 
majority.152 Sotomayor held that MLBP’s restrictions are 
ancillary to a legitimate purpose and are reasonably 
necessary to achieve MLBP’s efficiency-enhancing 
objectives.153 In particular, collective trademark licensing 
lowers transaction and trademark enforcement costs and 
offers one-stop shopping for licensees.154 The provisions also 
eliminate negative externalities that may otherwise distort 
 
than 300 licenses outstanding for some 4,000 products in the United States, 
along with licenses to some 170 licensees for sales of products outside of the 
United States. 
Id. at 319.  
 146.  Salvino alleged that since the income from the exploitation of each team’s 
intellectual property was equally shared among each member team, this was nothing 
but a horizontal price fixing scheme by individual competitors. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 
320. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor disagreed, stating that the elimination 
of price competition between the clubs for IP licensing “is the essence of price fixing.” 
An agreement between competitors that has the purpose and effect of fixing, stabilizing, 
or raising prices results in the same. Were the Majority correct, “competing companies 
could evade the antitrust laws simply by creating a ‘joint venture’ to serve as the 
exclusive seller of their competing products. . .” Id. at 335. 
 150.  This competitive balance is essential to both the viability of the clubs and 
public interest in the sport. Id. 
 151.  Id. at 331-32. 
 152.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 334-41. 
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Mitten, supra note 23, at 926. 
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the incentives of MLBP and limit potential efficiency gains.155 
Accordingly, collective exclusive trademark licensing not only 
fails to generate substantial anticompetitive effects, but also 
fosters redeeming procompetitive benefits. 
2. Collective Exclusive Product Category Licensing and the 
NFLP 
The anticompetitive harms created by NFLP’s restrictions, 
classified as “collective exclusive product category licensing,” 
have far greater anticompetitive effects, than the collective 
exclusive trademark licensing agreements that were used by 
MLBP.156  In pushing for a quick-look analysis, ANI must 
stress the differences between NFLP’s provisions and MLBP’s 
provisions.  This is because NFLP not only collectively 
markets the teams’ intellectual property, but it also 
designates an exclusive licensee for such purposes.157 The 
agreement to grant exclusive licensee rights, in tandem with 
the agreement to license collectively, significantly reduces 
competition in the market for licensing NFL-branded 
apparel.158 
Collective exclusive product category limitations, although 
found only in the context of professional football, are neither 
new nor unique to the context of football apparel as reflected 
in American Needle.  NFLP created the exclusivity agreement 
in the face of a decline in the retail value of its various 
trademarked merchandise.159 In an effort to increase 
trademark-licensing revenues, NFLP entered into multiple 
licensing agreements which granted exclusive product 
categories for the licensee.160  By eliminating competing 
licensees, exclusive product category licensing allows 
designated licensees to obtain “a premium price through a 
large advance, high minimum guarantees, and potentially a 
 
 155.  An example would be the so-called free-rider problem, whereby another Club 
might benefit disproportionately from the actions of MLBP in licensing the MLB brand, 
decreasing incentives for the MLBP to develop the intellectual property of MLB. 
Salvino, 542 F.3d at 340. For a more comprehensive discussion, see infra Section III.  
 156.  Mitten, supra note 23, at 927. 
 157.  Id. at 927-28. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  From 1996 to 2010, the aggregate value of NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB 
trademarked merchandise declined from approximately $8.8 billion to $7.83 billion. 
Meredith Ashley, Sports Licensing: 2010 Year-in-Review, LICENSING J. at 2 (Jan. 2011). 
 160.  Id. 
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higher royalty rate.”161 
Here, NFLP has signed a ten-year exclusivity agreement 
with Reebok (now Nike and New Era) to license NFL apparel 
and headwear.162 As a result, these licensees have become the 
exclusive provider of apparel and headwear of the NFL.163 
This arrangement necessarily implies that all other 
competing licensees, including ANI, are denied the 
opportunity to license the intellectual property of the NFL. 
These collective exclusive product category limitations 
have clear anticompetitive harms.  From the outset, the 
restrictions can be viewed as a collective agreement among 
league clubs, precluding economic competition in the licensee 
market.164 As Professor Matthew Mitten has stated, 
“[p]rospective licensees have no alternative means of 
obtaining authorization to use league clubs’ trademarks[.]”165 
In effect, the agreement has eliminated competing 
manufacturers from the wholesale market for the distribution 
and sale of apparel and headwear products of the NFL.166 As a 
result, the supply of retail products has been reduced, leading 
to fewer consumer choices available for retail products 
bearing the trademarks of NFL clubs, with the few available 
sold at higher retail prices.167 
Another example of exclusive product category licensing 
behavior is the NFL’s exclusive interactive video game 
licensing agreement with Electronic Arts.168 In Pecover v. 
Electronic Arts, a pending antitrust case,169 plaintiffs who 
purchased the Madden NFL game series brought an antitrust 
class action against Electronic Arts (EA), alleging that EA 
foreclosed competition in the market for interactive football 
software. 
Plaintiffs argued that as a result of the exclusivity 
agreement, sports gamers were limited to a single choice 
among game manufacturers, with only the NFL and EA 
 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Mitten, supra note 23, at 927. 
 163.  Id. at 928. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Mitten, supra note 23, at 929. 
 169.  Pecover v. Electronic Arts, 633 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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reaping the rewards.170 Prior to the agreement, EA charged 
$29.95 for Madden NFL in a competitive market.171 After the 
exclusivity agreement, other companies stopped making the 
software, such as Take Two Interactive, who withdrew its 
NFL 2K5, a popular and less expensive NFL video game.172 
Competing game manufacturers were not able to re-enter the 
market with non-NFL branded interactive football software.173 
Immediately afterwards, EA increased its price for Madden 
NFL “nearly seventy percent to $49.95,”174 with EA now 
selling its interactive football software for up to $59.95.175 
In the ensuing litigation, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California, notwithstanding the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in American Needle, favoring 
NFLP,176 denied Defendant EA’s motion to dismiss the alleged 
antitrust violations.  The court observed that the series of 
exclusive deals between EA and the NFL “killed off” 
competition and “prevented [competitors] from reentering the 
market.”177 Given the facts presented by the Plaintiff, there 
existed enough plausible evidence to establish that the 
Defendant had behaved illegally.178 
Along with the manifested anticompetitive harms, 
collective exclusive product category limitation is also not a 
restraint ancillary to achieve any recognized procompetitive 
benefits.179 The restrictions are unnecessary to achieve such 
benefits as lowering transaction costs, lowering trademark 
rights enforcement costs, or enhancing competitive balance 
among league clubs.180 Rather than designating one exclusive 
licensee, any procompetitive benefits sought by NFLP could 
be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.181 
Evidently, the effects of NFLP’s exclusivity provision, in 
tandem with its collectivity provisions, pose serious 
 
 170.  Ashley, supra note 159, at 2. 
 171.  First Amended Complaint at 5, Pecover, 633 F.Supp.2d 976 (No. C 08-
2820VRW), 2011 WL 2609621.  
 172.  Pecover, 633 F.Supp.2d at 980. 
 173.  Id.  
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 177.  Pecover, 633 F.Supp. 2d at 983.  
 178.  Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 592-95 (2007).  
 179.  See infra Part III. for a detailed discussion on this point. 
 180.  Mitten, supra note 23, at 924. 
 181.  Id. at 930. 
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anticompetitive harms.  For these reasons, NFLP’s collective, 
exclusive product category licensing should be deemed invalid 
under a quick-look rule of reason. 
III. RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS 
In pressing its antitrust challenge, ANI must consider the 
holding of NCAA, which held that per se rules of illegality are 
inapplicable in the context of league sports.182 Rather, the 
challenged restraint should be evaluated under the “flexible 
Rule of Reason.”183 Accordingly, ANI’s inquiry focuses on 
whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition 
to the benefit of consumers and whether or not these 
restraints are reasonably necessary to achieve such 
efficiencies.184 
In this regard, the Supreme Court has formulated the 
following test: 
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and 
after the restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint and its 
effect, actual or probable.  The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained. . . .185 
The Rule of Reason inquiry described in the preceding 
quote can be divided into the following prongs: First, what 
competitive harm results or is threatened by the 
collaborators’ activities; second, what are the pro-competitive 
“redeeming virtues” of the challenged collaboration; third, 
does an “on balance” evaluation of the anticompetitive harms 
and procompetitive virtues suggest that the restrictions are 
reasonable; and fourth, are there less restrictive alternatives 
– that is, is the restraint reasonably necessary for the 
achievement of any such legitimate objectives?186 
 
 182.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-03 (1984). 
    183.   American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 2010 WL 2025207, at *12 (May 
24, 2010).  
 184.  Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis Of Sports League Contracts With Cable 
Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 489 (1990) (There exists “a long-standing antitrust 
tradition of exploring less restrictive alternatives before sanctioning agreements among 
competitors . . . the antitrust laws must [] condemn agreements both harmful to 
consumers and unnecessary to achieve efficiencies in production or distribution . . . .”).  
 185.  Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918). 
 186.  PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1502 (3d ed. 
2010). 
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A. Competitive Harm that Results by Collaborators’ Activities 
Under the first prong,  ANI can specify the substantial 
competitive harms that result from NFLP’s restrictions on 
pricing and output.  NFLP has forced each member team to 
relinquish control over its own individual intellectual 
property.  Subject to the whim of NFLP, individual NFL 
teams are thereby unable to set prices or control output of 
their products. 
1. Price 
From the outset, ANI should note the anticompetitive 
harms stemming from NFLP’s price restrictions.  According to 
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum, a “combination formed for the 
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, 
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate 
or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”187  This is because price 
is the “central nervous system of the economy.”188 Therefore, 
an agreement that “interfere[s] with the setting of price by 
free market forces” is illegal on its face.189 
As mentioned, in the context of Major League Baseball, 
each MLB club designates MLBP to set the price of the 
competing clubs’ merchandise, with MLBP dividing all profits 
generated from the sales equally among the clubs.190 In 
Salvino, the plaintiff alleged that MLBP’s price provisions 
constituted a horizontal agreement among competing entities 
to “fix the compensation [MLB clubs] receive.”191 The 
individual clubs have relinquished all control over the price of 
their own products and now receive an equal amount of 
revenue, “regardless of merit or individual contribution.”192 
In her concurring opinion,193 Judge Sotomayor faults the 
Majority for adopting an “overly formalistic view of price 
 
 187.  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
 188.  Id. at 224 n. 59. 
 189.  United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1968). 
 190.  See Major League Baseball Props. Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 295 (2d 
Cir. 2008).  
 191.  Id. at 320. 
 192.  Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant at 7, 
Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1867-
cv), 2006 WL 6174626.  
 193.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 334 (Sotamayor, J., concurring). 
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fixing.”194 Through their reasoning, the Majority has failed to 
address Salvino’s contention of price fixing by MLBP.195  
Sotomayor held that, because the MLB clubs gave MLBP the 
sole authority to set prices for the licenses of the individual 
clubs, MLBP has “commandeered the rights of its 
members.”196  In effect, MLBP has set the price for each Club’s 
team-specific merchandise.197  Sotomayor analogized such 
conduct to that of competitors creating a pre-textual “joint 
venture,” to serve as the exclusive seller of their competing 
products.198 Based upon the aforementioned opinions, MLBP’s 
conduct constitutes a price-restriction by competing 
entities.199 
Similar to Salvino, NFL teams have adopted a revenue-
sharing agreement that eliminates price competition.200 The 
league as a whole has designated NFLP to exclusively exploit 
the intellectual property of all the teams.201 In exchange, 
NFLP distributes the earned revenues equally among the 
teams, regardless of the proportion of sales generated by the 
intellectual property of each individual team.202 As was held 
true by Salvino, such cooperative conduct by competing 
entities in the NFL is the essence of “price-fixing.”203 
2. Output 
ANI should also note the significant anticompetitive 
harms stemming from NFLP’s output restrictions.  These 
restrictions force each NFL owner to cede control over 
 
    194.    Id.  
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 326 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 
106 n. 30 (1984)).  
 197.  Id. at 336. 
 198.  Id.  
 199.  The mere agreement among competitors to exchange price information is a per 
se price-fixing violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 
310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
 200.  Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at ¶ 33. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  If allowed to license their own intellectual property, more power teams, such as 
the Dallas Cowboys, would set their own prices and receive revenues exceeding their 
pro rata share of profits. See id. 
 203.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 335 (Sotamayor, J., concurring). (“[T]he effect of the 
agreement clearly eliminates price competition between the Clubs for trademark 
licenses. An agreement to eliminate price competition from the market is the essence of 
price fixing.”). 
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licensing of its products to NFLP.204 Because a relative 
handful of clubs account for the bulk of revenues in any given 
year, the arrangement stymies the clubs’ individual abilities 
of production, and makes output unresponsive to consumer 
preferences.205 As a “direct, actual, probable, and intended 
result . . . [NFLP has denied] individual member clubs the 
right freely to compete in the market.”206 
Likewise, in Salvino, the plaintiff contended that MLBP’s 
collectivity arrangements are naked output restrictions.207 In 
designating MLBP as the central licensor, individual MLB 
clubs have necessarily agreed to forgo their own output.208 The 
agreement in Salvino is an “express agreement to reduce 
output,”209 and reduces output “by its terms.”210 
A majority of the Second Circuit panel, however, disagreed 
that output is necessarily restricted.  The Court held that, “a 
mere refusal to grant a license to Salvino would not suffice to 
support a claim of antitrust violation.”211 As a matter of fact, 
“the Clubs’ agreement to make MLBP their exclusive licensor 
does not by its express terms restrict or reduce the number of 
licenses to be issued; it merely alters the identity of the 
licenses’ issuer.”212  Other than Salvino, various licensees are 
still able to license the clubs’ intellectual property through 
MLBP.  In fact, the record showed a sizeable increase in the 
number of licensees for the intellectual property of MLBP; 
with output growing from about 100 licensees in 1987 to over 
300 licensees outstanding for some 4,000 products in the 
United States, by 2005.213  
Here, in contrast to Major League Baseball’s collectivity 
arrangements, NFLP’s addition of an exclusivity agreement 
with Reebok and Nike has absolutely lowered the licensee 
base.  While with MLBP, multiple licensees could still 
compete for the intellectual property rights of the clubs, here, 
 
 204.  Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at ¶ 4.  
 205.  Id.at ¶ 74. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant, supra 
note 192, at 6.  
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Major League Baseball Props. Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 318 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. at 309.  
 213.  Id. at 297-98. 
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NFLP has designated only Reebok (now Nike and New Era) to 
license the NFL teams’ intellectual property.  Therefore, 
NFLP’s arrangements have far greater anticompetitive harm 
in reducing the marketable output. 
 
B. Pro-Competitive “Redeeming Virtues” of the Challenged 
Collaboration 
In evaluating ANI’s antitrust challenge, Courts need to 
consider redeeming pro-competitive virtues of NFLP’s 
restraint.  NFLP has advanced several arguments to suggest 
that the pro-competitive benefits of its provisions outweigh 
the anti-competitive harms.  However, as will be explained, 
NFLP’s arguments rely on faulty premises that likely defeat 
an “on-balance” judgment of reasonableness.214 
Similar to MLBP’s arguments in Salvino, NFLP has 
justified its restrictions by relying heavily on Broadcast Music 
Inc v. Columbia Broadcasting System.215 In Broadcast Music, 
individual artists granted licensing organizations, including 
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
(ASCAP) and Broadcast Music Inc (BMI), nonexclusive rights 
to license their works.216  In turn, ASCAP and BMI granted 
blanket licenses to licensees to perform all of the compositions 
of member artists.217 The fees that licensees paid were usually 
a percentage of licensees’ total revenues or a flat dollar 
amount.218 Such fees were independent of the amount of music 
actually used by licensees.219 
The plaintiff, CBS alleged that the ASCAP and BMI 
arrangements violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, because they 
constituted “illegal price fixing.”220 Through its arrangement 
with individual artists to create the blanket license, the 
ASCAP and BMI have set the price for use of individual 
artists’ works.221 
The Supreme Court disagreed with CBS.  The Court 
 
   214.     AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 186 at ¶ 1508.  
 215.  Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 216.  Id. at 5. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 6. 
 221.  Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 6. 
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looked to the fact that a joint selling arrangement, such as the 
one promoted by ASCAP and BMI, could be so efficient that it 
would reap otherwise unattainable efficiencies and be pro-
competitive.222  In particular, in the composition market, there 
existed “thousands of users, thousands of copyright owners, 
and millions of compositions.”223 Given this fact, a central 
licensing entity accomplished the goals of reducing 
transaction costs, integrating sales, and improving 
monitoring and enforcement against unauthorized copyright 
use, all of which would present difficult and expensive 
problems if left to individuals.224  The result is that “the whole 
is truly greater than the sum of its parts,” creating in effect, a 
different product.225 
Similar to BMI, MLBP argued that its arrangements 
allowed it to reap otherwise unattainable pro-competitive 
efficiencies.  Defendants argued that, through MLBP, the 
Clubs have been able to (1) reduce transaction costs, (2) 
integrate sales, (3) more effectively enforce and monitor its 
intellectual property, and (4) improve quality control.226 
MLBP’s arguments, which are essentially identical to those 
presented by NFLP,227 will be discussed in the order they are 
presented. 
First, as a selling agent for the Clubs’ intellectual 
property, MLBP allows more products to be licensed by 
reducing transaction costs.228 Without MLBP, a potential 
licensee must approach each Club separately to negotiate 
licenses.  The potential licensee may be unable to obtain 
licenses from all the Clubs.229 The ability to offer a one-stop 
shop for licenses thus reduces the amount of time and effort 
 
 222.  Id. at 20. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. at 21. 
 226.  See generally Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Defendant-Appellee, Major 
League Baseball Props. v. Salvino Inc., 542 F.3d. 290 (2006) (No. 06-1867-cv), 2006 WL 
6174627. 
 227.  Joint Appendix, American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, No. 08-661, 2009 
WL 3006320 (Sept. 18, 2009). 
 228.  The NFLP argued that it is able to reduce transaction costs by offering a one-
stop shop for the package of NFL license rights, without which licensing rights would 
be prohibitively expensive for licensees to acquire on their own. Id. at 140.  
 229.  For example, in one year, Houston Astros refused to license rights to Topps, 
and that year, the Topps set of baseball cards did not include a single Astros team card. 
Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Defendant-Appellee, supra note 226, at 9. 
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required to obtain rights to the intellectual property of the 
MLB.230 
Second, the Clubs have been able to integrate sales and 
realize efficiencies in promotions, advertising and 
marketing.231 MLBP has been able to employ companies to 
provide marketing information, which it uses to develop 
campaigns and product lines for the benefit of all Clubs.232 
MLBP is also able to target and negotiate with national 
retailers, something a single Club that offers products bearing 
only its individual mark cannot do.233 
Third, MLBP is able to achieve efficiencies in intellectual 
property enforcement.234 Prior to the creation of MLBP, “there 
was open-season on Club marks, unauthorized merchandise 
was the marketplace norm, and the name ‘Major League 
Baseball’ had little identity and no commercial value.”235  
Since then, MLBP has obtained thousands of trademark 
registrations and enforcements for MLB Club marks.236 MLBP 
is able to identify from its own records and history whether a 
particular product is licensed and if not, whether to exercise 
enforcement measures.237 
Fourth and final point, a centralized entity such as MLBP 
can ensure that the MLB intellectual property is used 
properly.  In particular, the MLBP can assure that the 
licensees’ use of the Clubs’ trade dress and logos are correct 
and accurate, that the licensees have used the proper form, 
that any copyright or trademark symbol is prominently 
displayed, and that the product reflects the licensing 
agreement.238  In line with quality control, a centralized 
 
 230.  This is especially important for manufacturers of baseball cards, video games, 
etc.  
 231.  The NFLP argued that NFLP’s extensive marketing and promotion efforts and 
relationship with major retailers benefit consumers and licensees. NFLP is able to offer 
such market participants “centralized support” of the entire line of NFL-licensed goods. 
Joint Appendix, supra note 227, at 140. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  The NFLP argued that NFLP is able to offer trademark registration and 
enforcement. For example, NFLP manages a “worldwide trademark portfolio of over 
8,000 registrations and applications.” The NFLP is able to provide clearance searches, 
send “cease and desist” letters, initiate civil litigation, and handle trademark 
prosecutions before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. at 142. 
 235.  Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant, supra note 226, at 7. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  See id.  
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licensor such as MLBP saves the licensees the need to obtain 
quality control approvals from a myriad of separate and 
conflicting quality control centers of the individual MLB 
Clubs.239 
1. Rebuttal to Pro-competitive Justifications 
In evaluating ANI’s antitrust challenge, the anti-
competitive harms of NFLP’s restrictions should be balanced 
with its procompetitive benefits.240  This allows courts to reach 
an “on balance” judgment about “reasonableness.”241 This 
balance should be the guiding force in determining whether a 
Sherman Act violation has occurred. 
a. Difference in BMI versus NFLP 
There are important differences in the NFLP provisions, 
such as the exclusivity and revenue sharing obligations, 
which make BMI an inapt precedent.  First, in BMI, artists 
had the ability to offer their licenses on a nonexclusive basis 
to BMI or ASCAP, while retaining the unfettered ability to 
license their products themselves.242 By contrast, the 
provisions of NFLP (and also MLBP) mandate that individual 
teams license their intellectual property to the central entities 
on an exclusive basis.243 Therefore, individual teams within 
the NFL actually lose the ability to license their own 
intellectual property. 
The Salvino court holds that this exclusivity aspect is 
insignificant.  The interests of each Club are interdependent 
and it is this “interdependence and Major League Baseball’s 
need for competitive balance among the Clubs [that] 
distinguish the Clubs from the individual composers and 
publishers of music who were the subject of Broadcast 
Music . . . .”244 
However, the complaints brought by Jones squarely rebut 
 
 239.  Joint Appendix, supra note 225, at 144. (The NFLP argued that its quality 
control department ensures that the NFL’s intellectual property is used in an 
appropriate manner with licensed products and that licensed products “reflect the 
branding goals associated with NFL football.”).  
 240.  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 186, at ¶ 1507. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 243.  Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 323 (2d Cir 2008). 
 244.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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the premise that individual teams’ interests are 
interdependent.  Jones’s complaint suggests that the 
intellectual property of the Cowboys is extremely valuable.245 
In one fiscal year alone, more than 20% of the revenue 
generated by NFLP from licensed products came from 
products bearing Cowboys marks alone.246 Yet, the Cowboys 
only received one-thirtieth of the distributed profits of 
NFLP.247 Evidently, Jones is not dependent upon NFLP.  
Rather, Jones must sacrifice his profits to subsidize less 
successful teams in the NFL. 
Second, in BMI, the agreement to designate ASCAP and 
BMI as central licensors is premised on individual artists 
receiving royalties proportional to the use of their 
copyrights.248 Tying royalties received to frequency of use 
provides individual artists with economic incentives to 
promote their own products.  In contrast, the NFLP 
provisions mandate that each member team receive an equal 
distribution of revenues regardless of use or contribution of its 
individual trademarks.249 
Such provisions have the effect of reducing the overall 
quality of NFL merchandise.  Given the wide disparity in 
contributions made by each individual team, distributing 
revenues equally “adversely affect[s] the quality of goods 
available.”250 In the absence of this agreement, success in the 
sale of licensed merchandise would be tied to the competition 
for fans as well as the ability to create and distribute more 
desirable products.  However, under NFLP’s revenue-sharing 
policy, each team receives an equal share of revenues 
generated from sales of intellectual property, regardless of 
contribution.  As a result, the teams have been deprived of the 
economic incentive to effectively market and promote the 
quality of their own brands.251 
Such provisions also foster anti-competitiveness in the 
form of a free rider problem.  In economics, the free-rider 
 
 245.  See Amended Complaint, supra note 43 at ¶  4. 
 246.  Id. at ¶ 40.   
 247.  Id.  
 248.  Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979). 
 249.  For example, the Yankees contribute the highest grossing revenue out of all 
the MLB teams but receive the same revenue as the lowest grossing team. Complaint 
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, supra note 49. 
 250.  See id. at ¶  13. 
 251.  See id. at ¶ 41. 
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problem refers to a situation where some individuals consume 
more than their fair share of a public resource, or shoulder 
less than a fair share of the costs of its production.252  An 
example involves a club member who goes to all the club 
events without ever contributing to the club’s annual fund 
drive.253 The free rider problem frequently surfaces in the 
context of NFLP’s licensing practices.254 Here, the fixed 
income from the NFLP is derived from the efforts of the more 
successful teams; thus, the lowest grossing team has less 
incentive to invest in the success of its own brands. 
Creating free riding among individual teams also 
counteracts NFLP’s argument that if teams were allowed to 
grant individual licenses, they would free-ride off of the 
actions of the NFLP in promoting the league brand.255 In fact, 
it is doubtful whether NFLP has actually promoted its 
league’s brand and whether such a centralized effort is 
superior to individualized efforts by the separate teams.  In 
Jones’s complaint, for instance, the plaintiff pointed to the 
bloated administrative costs NFLP imposes upon its 
members.256 In one fiscal year, for instance, NFLP spent 64% 
of its gross revenues, generated from its own members, on 
direct costs and administrative expenses alone.257 Such costs 
are, “to all appearances, extraordinarily and wastefully 
high.”258 
Clear from Jones’s Complaints is the fact that less 
successful teams are profiting off of the successes of other 
teams.  Each marks’ value and strength “vary widely,”259 and 
the contribution by each club is widely disparate.260 As a 
result, the NFLP as a “cartel, hinders efficiency by creating 
the incentive for free-riding.”261 For these reasons, the NFLP 
provisions are much more anticompetitive in light of the 
 
 252.  Free Rider Problem, PRINCETON, http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/ 
wiki100k/docs/Free_rider_problem.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).  
 253.  The Free Rider, KENT STATE, http://www.personal.kent.edu/~cupton/ 
Lectures%20in%20Microeconomics/powerpointslides/Micro%20PDF/The%20Free%20Ri
der.pdf. 
 254.  Amended Complaint, supra note 43. 
 255.  Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant, supra note 226. 
 256.  Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at ¶ 4. 
 257.  Id. at ¶ 39. 
 258.  Id. at ¶ 38. 
 259.  Id. at ¶ 40.  
 260.  Id.  
 261.  Id. at ¶ 47.  
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Sherman Act. 
b. Differences in MLBP vs NFLP 
The anticompetitive harms stemming from NFLP’s 
provisions also cut deeper than those of MLBP.  Whereas 
MLBP allows the existence of multiple licensees and ties 
licensing costs to revenues, NFLP limits licensing to a single 
licensee and segregates licensing costs from revenues. 
First, in Salvino, although Plaintiff complained that 
prospective licensees, including itself, “live at the whim and 
caprice of MLB . . . [as MLBP] can arbitrarily exclude any 
[licensee] it wishes,”262 the court disagreed and held that 
antitrust claimants cannot show harm merely by “showing 
that the plaintiff has been harmed as an individual 
competitor.”263 In fact, MLBP actually increased the Clubs’ 
potential licensees base;264 boosting the number and variety of 
MLB-licensed products that the Clubs would have achieved 
through individual licensing.265 
By contrast, in the context of NFLP, the harm is not just to 
ANI as an “individual competitor,” but rather, on “competition 
as a whole . . . .”266 Reason being, NFLP does not tolerate 
multiple competing licensees, and only allows the existence of 
a single licensee.267  Thus, individual licensees are, in fact, 
subject to the arbitrary whim of NFLP. As gatekeeper to the 
licensing market, NFLP can exclude, at any time, any licensee 
other than the one designated. 
Second, MLBP’s provisions require licensees to pay MLBP 
a percentage of the profit they receive from the overall sale of 
their MLB-branded products.268 By contrast, NFLP sells 
licenses to licensees for a “sum certain.”269 The price for the 
teams’ intellectual property is therefore independent of 
ultimate sales of NFL-branded merchandise. Rudimentary 
economics would suggest that because licensees pay the same 
 
 262.  Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant, supra 
note 192, at 7. 
 263.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 308. 
 264.  Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant, supra note 226.  
 265.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 308. 
 266.  Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 44 (1997). 
 267.  Mitten, supra note 23, at 927. 
 268.  Salvino, 542 F.3d at 303. 
 269.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 118, n. 30 (1984). 
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price for each individual teams’ branded merchandise 
regardless of overall sales, NFLP’s provisions limit the 
available consumer choices of retail products bearing the NFL 
teams’ trademarks.270 Similar to NCAA,271 where each telecast 
was sold for a uniform price, regardless of quality or 
popularity, NFLP’s controls make the price paid for the 
team’s intellectual property unresponsive to the relative 
quality of the teams playing the games.272  Ultimately, NFLP’s 
provisions result in a market that is unresponsive to 
consumer demand.273 
C. Less-Restrictive Alternatives 
NFLP’s provisions as it stands, fail to be less restrictive 
than necessary to achieve its purported procompetitive 
efficiencies.274  Rather than be subject to the control and 
supervision of NFLP, individual NFL teams should be allowed 
to pursue merchandise development and innovation 
independent of a central entity. 
In their article,275 authors Stephen Ross and Stefan 
Szymanski articulate that the traditional structure of club-
run leagues impose significant costs in a variety of markets 
where sports leagues operate.276  With respect to NCAA, Ross 
and Szymanski faulted the Supreme Court for assuming that 
the presence of a member-run venture was an indispensable 
part of the parties’ pro-competitive cooperation.277 In 
particular, the Justices overlooked “the significant antitrust 
risks from [sports leagues’] conscious decision to operate a 
member-run venture  . . . .”278 
The crux of Ross and Szymanski’s argument is that club-
 
 270.  Mitten, supra note 23, at 928.  
 271.  NCAA, 468 U.S. at 118. 
 272.  Id.  
 273.  Id. 
 274.  PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1402 (1986). (“[I]f an agreement with any 
significant potential to harm competition is justified by its potential for efficiency, then 
the agreement must be tailored in such a fashion as to do the least harm possible to 
competition without giving up the efficiency gains.”).  
 275.  Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint Ventures: 
Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and Less Like The United 
Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213 (2006). 
 276.  See id. at 217. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. at 216. 
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run leagues will necessarily make decisions about organizing 
the league that limit the extent of economic competition.279 In 
the licensing and merchandise context, economists suggest 
that decision-making should be left to those who have the best 
information.280 However, due to the fact that sports leagues 
centralize all aspects of the marketing of team merchandise, 
individual owners cannot pursue innovative ideas in order to 
add revenue.281 Instead, the licensing is done centrally with 
little or no participation from the individual teams. 
Rather than the current set-up, vesting decision-making in 
entities with the best knowledge would be most efficient and 
responsive to consumer demand.  As an example, in Jerry 
Jones’ complaint against NFLP, Jones claimed that as a 
franchise owner, he should be able to maximize his licensing 
revenues instead of “settling” for his cut from the NFLP.282 An 
owner who has invested millions in his own team has a far 
greater incentive to aggressively market his team.283 One 
would expect, therefore, that an efficient league would divide 
the merchandising responsibility, and sell those parts of the 
activities that the teams understands best, back to the 
respective franchise.284 
The model proposed by Jones is the model of the soccer 
clubs in the English Premier League and the Spanish Liga 
BBVA, whose operations are substantially similar.285 In these 
soccer clubs, there is little cooperative licensing of 
merchandise.  Instead, each individual club has its own shops 
and operations.286 Without the need to serve a centralized 
entity, individual clubs could make independent decisions 
resulting in arrangements that are more efficient and 
profitable.  Indeed, the most valuable sports franchises in the 
world is the Spanish soccer team Real Madrid, with an 
estimated value  of $3.3 billion, followed closely by the soccer 
 
 279.  Id.  
 280.  Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). 
 281.  Ross & Szymanski, supra note 275, at 215. 
 282.  William J. Hoffman et. al., Dallas’ Head Cowboy Emerges Victorious in a 
Licensing Showdown With the N.F.L.: National Football League Properties v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 255, 283 (1997). 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Ross & Szymanski, supra note 275, at 230. 
 285.  Id.  
 286.  Id. at n. 61. 
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teams, F.C. Barcelona and Manchester United, F.C.287 
1. Application of Ross & Szymanski’s Model to the NFL 
Because the NFL teams remain separate business entities, 
the idea inspired by Ross and Szymanski should be fully 
transplanted to the context of the NFL.  Within the 2001 
exclusivity contract with Reebok, there exists a clause that 
allows NFL owners to pursue new ideas for marketing or 
sponsorship independently with an agreed-upon share of 
proceeds going to the league.288 In particular, NFLP has 
agreed to grant individual NFL owners the right to retain the 
ability to become private wholesaler, retailer and distributor 
of its own apparel.289 So long as a team reaches a certain 
revenue threshold to be paid to the league, the team is 
entitled to keep any excess revenue generated.290 
Although the team’s ability to retain its own profits is a 
move in the right direction, there still exist anticompetitive 
harms rooted in revenue sharing schemes of NFLP.  In 
particular, the profit threshold teams must reach before being 
able to retain their own revenues, remains prohibitively 
high.291 Such threshold is determined by an average of the 
individual team’s prior earnings, with above-average earnings 
being extremely rare.292 For example, the Cowboy’s share of 
NFL sales has been 16%, and so it must guarantee a 
minimum of 16% to the league, retaining the excess, if any, 
for itself.293 For teams that only generate 2% or 3%, the 
minimal threshold is 5% and so the team must pay at least 
5% to the league.294 Therefore, these teams would rather 
settle for their “cut” from NFLP rather than pursue strategies 
maximizing individual profits. 
While the new adoptions are not fool proof, it is a good 
 
 287.  Michael David Smith, Sharing the Wealth Has Made NFL Owners the Richest 
in the World, NBC SPORTS (July 16, 2013), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/ 
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start.  The new marketing provisions allow teams to have 
even greater control of their own brands.  For example, based 
on its ability to keep revenues from stadium sponsorships, the 
Dallas Cowboys generated more than $80 million in 
sponsorship from companies such as Ford Motor, Bank of 
America, PepsiCo, Dr. Pepper and Miller Brewing, almost $20 
million more than any other football team.295  Now, with the 
innovation in merchandising independence, teams “can decide 
what color and design [they] want. . .decide how many hats 
[they] want sold. . .[and] decide if there’s one hat made and 
sold or 100,000 hats.”296  Given this potential for individual 
development, there is no reason why individual teams should 
not retain greater control over its own intellectual property at 
the expense of the outmoded central entity. 
CONCLUSION 
After an analysis of the myriad of possibilities on remand, 
it is apparent that the current NFLP provisions pose serious 
harms.  First, the merchandising of professional football 
products constitutes a unique market.  Second, under a quick-
look inquiry, the NFLP provisions are naked restraints on 
price and output without ancillary benefits.  Finally, from the 
standpoint of the rule of reason, the substantial 
anticompetitive effects outweigh the minimal procompetitive 
benefits, and less restrictive alternatives exist for fostering 
greater procompetitive benefits.  For the reasons articulated, 
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